mawkone
6b8862ef2b
Closes checklist items F-01..F-06, D-01..D-28, S-01..S-10, C-01..C-07, B-01..B-07, R-01..R-02, O-03. Security (28 deletions + 10 auth gates): - Delete 28 unauthenticated debug/cursor/firebase/test routes - Gate ai/chat, ai/conversation, context/summarize, work-completed with withTenantProject/withAuth - Add HMAC-SHA256 signature verification to webhooks/coolify - Switch all admin secret comparisons to timingSafeStringEq Foundations (lib/server/*): - api-handler.ts: withAuth, withTenantProject, withWorkspace, withAdminSecret, withRateLimit - logger.ts: structured request-scoped logging with turnId - audit-log.ts: writeAuditLog helper + audit_log table - rate-limit.ts: Postgres sliding window rate limiter - coolify-webhook.ts: verifyCoolifySignature - timing-safe.ts: timingSafeStringEq Chat hardening (chat/route.ts): - MAX_TOOL_ROUNDS 15 → 8 (C-01) - Loop detection: hard-break at 3 identical fingerprints (was 5) (C-02) - Add 6-consecutive-tool-call hard-break (C-02) - Mode: respond first, act second prompt block (C-03) - SSE heartbeat every 25s via setInterval (C-04) - Per-tool 45s timeout via Promise.race (C-05) - turnId per-turn UUID for log correlation (C-06) - Recovery fires when roundsSinceText >= 4 (C-07) - SSE plan event on plan_task_add/edit (B-05) Beta features: - invites table + GET/POST /api/invites (P4.8) - invites/[token] validate + redeem (P4.8) - fs_project_dev_servers table + lib/server/dev-server-state.ts (P6.B1) - fs_project_secrets table + CRUD routes (P6.D2) - lib/integrations/brief-extract.ts (P3.7) Documentation: - app/api/ROUTES.md: full route map with auth + tenant
41 lines
1.2 KiB
TypeScript
41 lines
1.2 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Coolify webhook signature verification.
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*
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* Coolify (≥ 4.0.0-beta.300) signs every webhook with HMAC-SHA256 of the
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* raw body using the per-app `webhook_secret`. The signature is sent in
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* the `X-Coolify-Signature-256` header as `sha256=<hex>`.
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*
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* If the per-app secret is not set, Coolify sends the body unsigned. In
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* that case we reject the call: every prod deploy MUST set a secret.
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*
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* Mirrors the pattern in `lib/gitea.ts:verifyWebhookSignature`.
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*/
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import { timingSafeStringEq } from "@/lib/server/timing-safe";
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export async function verifyCoolifySignature(
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body: string,
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signatureHeader: string | null,
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secret: string,
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): Promise<boolean> {
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if (!secret) return false;
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if (!signatureHeader?.startsWith("sha256=")) return false;
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const encoder = new TextEncoder();
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const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(
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"raw",
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encoder.encode(secret),
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{ name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" },
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false,
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["sign"],
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);
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const sigBytes = await crypto.subtle.sign("HMAC", key, encoder.encode(body));
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const expected =
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"sha256=" +
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Array.from(new Uint8Array(sigBytes))
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.map((b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
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.join("");
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return timingSafeStringEq(expected, signatureHeader);
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}
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