fix(coolify): strip is_build_time from env writes; add reveal + GCS

Coolify v4's POST/PATCH /applications/{uuid}/envs only accepts key,
value, is_preview, is_literal, is_multiline, is_shown_once. Sending
is_build_time triggers a 422 "This field is not allowed." — it's now
a derived read-only flag (is_buildtime) computed from Dockerfile ARG
usage. Breaks agents trying to upsert env vars.

Three-layer fix so this can't regress:
  - lib/coolify.ts: COOLIFY_ENV_WRITE_FIELDS whitelist enforced at the
    network boundary, regardless of caller shape
  - app/api/workspaces/[slug]/apps/[uuid]/envs: stops forwarding the
    field; returns a deprecation warning when callers send it; GET
    reads both is_buildtime and is_build_time for version parity
  - app/api/mcp/route.ts: same treatment in the MCP dispatcher;
    AI_CAPABILITIES.md doc corrected

Also bundles (not related to the above):
  - Workspace API keys are now revealable from settings. New
    key_encrypted column stores AES-256-GCM(VIBN_SECRETS_KEY, token).
    POST /api/workspaces/[slug]/keys/[keyId]/reveal returns plaintext
    for session principals only; API-key principals cannot reveal
    siblings. Legacy keys stay valid for auth but can't reveal.
  - P5.3 Object storage: lib/gcp/storage.ts + lib/workspace-gcs.ts
    idempotently provision a per-workspace GCS bucket, service
    account, IAM binding and HMAC key. New POST /api/workspaces/
    [slug]/storage/buckets endpoint. Migration script + smoke test
    included. Proven end-to-end against prod master-ai-484822.

Made-with: Cursor
This commit is contained in:
2026-04-23 11:46:50 -07:00
parent 651ddf1e11
commit 3192e0f7b9
14 changed files with 1794 additions and 37 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
/**
* POST /api/workspaces/[slug]/keys/[keyId]/reveal
*
* Returns the plaintext `vibn_sk_...` token for an active workspace key.
*
* Intentionally restricted to SESSION principals. An API-key principal
* cannot reveal keys — this prevents a leaked agent token from being
* used to exfiltrate sibling keys. We use POST (not GET) to keep the
* secret out of server logs / the browser history / referrer headers.
*
* Returns 409 with { revealable: false } for legacy keys minted before
* the key_encrypted column existed — those plaintexts were never stored
* and can never be recovered. The caller should prompt the user to
* rotate (revoke + mint new).
*/
import { NextResponse } from 'next/server';
import {
requireWorkspacePrincipal,
revealWorkspaceApiKey,
} from '@/lib/auth/workspace-auth';
export async function POST(
request: Request,
{ params }: { params: Promise<{ slug: string; keyId: string }> },
) {
const { slug, keyId } = await params;
const principal = await requireWorkspacePrincipal(request, { targetSlug: slug });
if (principal instanceof NextResponse) return principal;
if (principal.source !== 'session') {
return NextResponse.json(
{ error: 'API keys can only be revealed from a signed-in session' },
{ status: 403 },
);
}
const revealed = await revealWorkspaceApiKey(principal.workspace.id, keyId);
if (!revealed) {
return NextResponse.json(
{
error:
'Key not found, already revoked, or was minted before reveal was enabled. ' +
'Rotate the key (revoke + create new) if you need the plaintext.',
revealable: false,
},
{ status: 409 },
);
}
return NextResponse.json({
id: revealed.id,
name: revealed.name,
prefix: revealed.prefix,
token: revealed.token,
});
}