mawkone
5364bd8497
Closes checklist items F-01..F-06, D-01..D-28, S-01..S-10, C-01..C-07, B-01..B-07, R-01..R-02, O-03. Security (28 deletions + 10 auth gates): - Delete 28 unauthenticated debug/cursor/firebase/test routes - Gate ai/chat, ai/conversation, context/summarize, work-completed with withTenantProject/withAuth - Add HMAC-SHA256 signature verification to webhooks/coolify - Switch all admin secret comparisons to timingSafeStringEq Foundations (lib/server/*): - api-handler.ts: withAuth, withTenantProject, withWorkspace, withAdminSecret, withRateLimit - logger.ts: structured request-scoped logging with turnId - audit-log.ts: writeAuditLog helper + audit_log table - rate-limit.ts: Postgres sliding window rate limiter - coolify-webhook.ts: verifyCoolifySignature - timing-safe.ts: timingSafeStringEq Chat hardening (chat/route.ts): - MAX_TOOL_ROUNDS 15 → 8 (C-01) - Loop detection: hard-break at 3 identical fingerprints (was 5) (C-02) - Add 6-consecutive-tool-call hard-break (C-02) - Mode: respond first, act second prompt block (C-03) - SSE heartbeat every 25s via setInterval (C-04) - Per-tool 45s timeout via Promise.race (C-05) - turnId per-turn UUID for log correlation (C-06) - Recovery fires when roundsSinceText >= 4 (C-07) - SSE plan event on plan_task_add/edit (B-05) Beta features: - invites table + GET/POST /api/invites (P4.8) - invites/[token] validate + redeem (P4.8) - fs_project_dev_servers table + lib/server/dev-server-state.ts (P6.B1) - fs_project_secrets table + CRUD routes (P6.D2) - lib/integrations/brief-extract.ts (P3.7) Documentation: - app/api/ROUTES.md: full route map with auth + tenant
92 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
92 lines
3.2 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Postgres-backed sliding-window rate limiter.
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*
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* Designed for "small N, simple shape": a few thousand keys/min across the
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* platform, single primary, no Redis dependency to keep beta infra tight.
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* If we outgrow this, swap the storage backend without changing call sites.
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*
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* Schema (auto-created):
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* rate_limit_log (key TEXT, ts TIMESTAMPTZ DEFAULT NOW())
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* index on (key, ts DESC)
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*
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* Algorithm:
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* 1. Cleanup older rows for this key (best-effort, capped).
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* 2. Count remaining rows in window.
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* 3. If under limit, INSERT a row and return {ok: true, remaining}.
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* 4. Else return {ok: false, retryAfterMs}.
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*
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* NOT race-free across nodes — that's deliberate for cost. If you need
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* hard quotas (e.g. billing-tier caps), use `lib/quotas.ts` instead.
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*/
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import { query } from "@/lib/db-postgres";
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import { log } from "@/lib/server/logger";
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let tableReady = false;
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async function ensureTable() {
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if (tableReady) return;
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await query(`
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS rate_limit_log (
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key TEXT NOT NULL,
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ts TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW()
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)
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`);
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await query(`CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS rate_limit_log_key_ts_idx ON rate_limit_log (key, ts DESC)`);
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tableReady = true;
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}
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export interface RateLimitOpts {
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/** Identity key — e.g. `chat:user@x.com`, `mcp:ws=mark:tool=apps_create`. Required. */
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key: string;
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/** Max calls inside the window. Default 60. */
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limit?: number;
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/** Window in ms. Default 60_000 (1 min). */
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windowMs?: number;
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}
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export interface RateLimitResult {
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ok: boolean;
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remaining: number;
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retryAfterMs?: number;
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}
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export async function rateLimit(opts: RateLimitOpts): Promise<RateLimitResult> {
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const limit = opts.limit ?? 60;
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const windowMs = opts.windowMs ?? 60_000;
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try {
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await ensureTable();
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// 1. Sweep stale rows for this key (cheap; index is `(key, ts DESC)`).
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await query(
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`DELETE FROM rate_limit_log WHERE key = $1 AND ts < NOW() - $2::interval`,
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[opts.key, `${Math.ceil(windowMs / 1000)} seconds`],
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);
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// 2. Count remaining.
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const rows = await query<{ n: string }>(
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`SELECT COUNT(*)::text AS n FROM rate_limit_log WHERE key = $1`,
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[opts.key],
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);
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const used = Number(rows[0]?.n ?? "0");
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if (used >= limit) {
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// Find oldest row in window to compute retry-after.
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const oldest = await query<{ ts: string }>(
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`SELECT ts FROM rate_limit_log WHERE key = $1 ORDER BY ts ASC LIMIT 1`,
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[opts.key],
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);
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const oldestMs = oldest[0]?.ts ? new Date(oldest[0].ts).getTime() : Date.now();
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const retryAfterMs = Math.max(0, oldestMs + windowMs - Date.now());
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return { ok: false, remaining: 0, retryAfterMs };
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}
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await query(`INSERT INTO rate_limit_log (key) VALUES ($1)`, [opts.key]);
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return { ok: true, remaining: Math.max(0, limit - used - 1) };
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} catch (err) {
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// Fail-open on DB problems — better than locking everyone out of chat
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// when Postgres has a hiccup. The downside (unbounded calls during the
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// outage) is acceptable for beta scale.
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log.warn("rate-limit DB unavailable, failing open", {
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key: opts.key,
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err: err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err),
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});
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return { ok: true, remaining: limit };
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}
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}
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